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ABSTRACT 
DIGITAL POLITICAL INFORMATION CONSUMPTION AND AMBIVALENT 
POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
Dane Ryan Warner 
August 5, 2019 
Understating how individuals form, reinforce, or change attitudes has a long history 
in political science research. This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by 
bridging the gap between the ambivalence and digital political communications literature 
by examining the relationship between digital political information consumption and 
ambivalent political attitudes. Using the American National Election Studies 2016 Time 
Series Study, I examine the role of digital political information consumption as a moderator 
of value conflict and ambivalent political attitudes. The findings suggest that increased 
levels of information gather significantly reduce group ambivalence, candidate 
ambivalence, and value ambivalence.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Without much difficulty, one can discover the vast influences which the internet 
has exerted on the course of human development. Even in countries such as Eritrea and 
Afghanistan where internet penetration is less than 10% of the population 
(InternetLiveStats 2018), political and economic actors use the internet to conduct their 
business in a global market. What developed as one government’s desire to create a secure 
and efficient method of communication has developed into one of the more universal 
features of the human social existence. One of the early visionaries of the what is now 
known as the internet, J.C.R. Licklider, described his vision as “a globally interconnected 
set of computers through which everyone could quickly access data and programs from 
any site” (Leiner et al. 1997). Many of the early visions of the internet imagined a 
democratic platform, in the sense that the inventors of the internet envisioned a networked 
system which had no political or economic authority regulating its function (Brate 2002). 
While theoretical work involving the internet began with its physical development, 
it took until the 1990s for the first social science article about the internet to appear (Dutton 
2013) and took until 2010 for the internet and its related developments to become a 
mainstream research area. While some scholars chip away at their corner of internet 
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studies, others are starting to unite multiple disciplines to study this profound piece of 
human development. This study seeks to contribute to this effort by examining the 
intersection of social psychology and political science. While both fields have contributed 
significantly to our understanding of attitudinal ambivalence and the effects of the internet 
on social behavior, neither has examined the role the internet might play on this important 
attitudinal state. 
The information we receive about the world around us has a significant impact on 
our personal development and our social development. If we look outside and see it is 
raining, we will grab an umbrella, or may even choose to remain inside. This, of course, 
assumes that we have already received and interpreted the relevant information, and know 
that rain is generally to be avoided. On the other hand, perhaps if we were as the those in 
Plato’s cave, we may find the rain an exciting new part of our world. Like Plato’s caveman, 
the pre-internet information environment limited many individuals to only the shadows of 
their interest. Historically, information was controlled by religious, economic, and political 
elites, or was limited by geographical distance. Today, individuals with open access to the 
internet can pursue and reinforce any of their information needs. 
While the internet has, at times, lived up to Licklider’s ideal, it has also been the 
enemy of his vision. This study seeks to examine the effects of having unlimited 
information at our fingertips. Is there such a thing as too much data? 
In the next chapter, I review the extensive body of literature regarding cognition 
and ambivalent political attitudes as well as some literature from political communication 
scholars. By examining the antecedents of ambivalent attitudes and their effects on political 
behavior and political decision making, I will build my case for why I expect the internet 
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to have a negative effect on attitudinal ambivalence. In chapter three, I will explain the data 
and methods I used to examine the relationship between digital political information 
consumption and ambivalent political attitudes. This chapter includes explanations of 
multiple ambivalence indices and provides oversight of how much of the public 
experiences attitudinal ambivalence regarding several political attitude objects. In chapter 
four, I will analyze the data and test my research question, does digital political information 
consumption reduce the level of ambivalence in the general public. The results suggest that 
the internet is an active moderator of ambivalence. Finally, in chapter five, I will conclude 
by discussing where and how my findings fit into the broader context. I will also discuss 
new opportunities for further studies, as undoubtedly, my results prompt additional 
questions. I also offer a discussion of how my results may shed some light on the discussion 
about a polarized American electorate.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 1 
What is Ambivalence? 
For a full understanding of ambivalence, it is necessary to give some background 
information on attitudes, generally, to get a sense of how ambivalence is incorporated into 
our collective understanding of how attitudes shape behavior and decision-making. 
Attitudes are one of the most ubiquitous constructs studied in social science research. 
While there has been variation in the scholarly definition of attitudes through decades of 
research, the general consensus in contemporary scholarship is that an attitude is an 
individual’s learned tendency to evaluate an object with some degree of positive or 
negative expression (Ajzen and Fishbein 2000; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Martinez et al. 
2005; Craig et al. 2003; Olson and Kendrick 2012). Early research on attitudes treated them 
as unidimensional, bipolar constructs (Thompson et al. 1995). This early treatment 
measured and gauged how positively or negatively people evaluated an attitude object 
1 Significant portions of the literature review of this thesis come directly from a chapter 
in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Political Decision Making "Ambivalence in Political 
Decision Making" authored by Dane Warner and Jason Gainous These portions were 
reproduced with copyright permissions from the Oxford Research Encyclopedia. 
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assuming that people’s positions were exclusively in one of those directions, and those who 
felt neither were often described as indifferent (Kaplan 1972; Martinez et al. 2005).
In contrast to the unidimensional model of attitudes of early research, the 
preeminent model in contemporary psychology and political science literature is the 
tripartite approach (Michael et al. 2004; Olson and Kendrick 2012; Thompson et al. 1995). 
The tripartite approach treats attitudes a multidimensional construct with cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral components. 
The tripartite approach to attitudes has disseminated downward from overall 
attitudes, to note, conceptualize, and measure attributes within each of the three 
components. Ambivalence is conceptualized as an attribute of both the cognitive and 
affective components of attitudes and has behavioral consequences. That said, as an 
attribute of attitudes, ambivalence largely falls under the umbrella of attitude strength 
(Ajzen 2001; Bassili 1996; Conner et al. 2002; Petty 2012). Whether a researcher is using 
survey instruments or conducting in-depth interviews, the data collected often contain 
measures of the various attributes of attitudes that characterize attitude strength, generally. 
Some of the primary attributes of attitude strength, other than ambivalence, include 
importance or the degree to which people care deeply about an issue and its significance to 
their daily lives (Boninger et al. 1995; Krosnick 1988; Krosnick and Abelson 1992), 
extremity or the distance from the midpoint on traditional attitude scales (Abelson et al. 
1982; Krosnick et al. 1993; Krosnick and Abelson 1992), certainty or the degree to which 
an individual is confident that his or her attitude toward an object is correct (Budd 1986; 
Krosnick and Schuman 1988), and accessibility is the strength of the object evaluation link 
in memory (Fazio 1995; Fazio and Williams 1986). 
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The focus on attitude strength here, is not only because ambivalence is an attribute 
of attitude strength, but also because, generally speaking, all its components can be 
consequential for behavior and decision-making under a wide range of circumstances 
(Ajzen 2001; Conner and Armitage 2008; Craig and Martinez 2004; Craig and Martinez 
2016; Guyer and Fabrigar 2015). This gives us a general sense of how ambivalence, as a 
characteristic of attitude strength, is consequential. Behavioral research across disciplines 
has identified how attitude strength structures patterns of consumption (Dursun and Tümer 
Kabadayı 2013), health decisions (Conner et al. 2002; Conner et al. 2003; Mccaul et al. 
1988), and directly related to political decision-making, it can influence one’s tendency to 
vote. The point here is that a range of various attitudes demonstratively predicts these and 
other behaviors offering substantial evidence that attitude strength conditions behavior 
(Bassili 1996; Howe and Krosnick 2017). 
The basic idea behind the attitude strength-behavior connection is that strong 
attitudes predict relevant behaviors better than weak attitudes (Howe and Krosnick 2017). 
Like attitudes, attitude strength is a multidimensional construct. Krosnick and Petty (1995) 
define attitude strength as the degree in which an attitude possesses persistence, resistance, 
impact on information processing and judgment, and behavior guidance. Attitude strength 
and these four features of it provide a foundation for much of the attitudinal research in the 
social sciences. For instance, Krosnick and colleagues (Krosnick et al. 1993) conducted a 
study based on the prior findings of Raden (1985) finding low to moderate positive 
correlations between dimensions of attitude strength indicating these dimensions did not 
represent a unidimensional strength. These dimensions, or attitude attributes, often interact 
with one another in complex ways (Olson and Kendrick 2012). One such way, these 
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dimensions of attitude strength may interact with behaviors, like decision-making, is 
through the degree to which one’s attitude is ambivalent. Again, since healthy attitudes are 
typically better predictors of behavior, extends to the relationship between ambivalence 
and behavior. Ambivalence may diminish the magnitude of the relationship between 
attitude and behavior (Craig et al. 2003). 
This brings directly to the broader concept of attitude strength, and purpose of this 
section of the study, defining ambivalence. Ambivalence refers to the individual experience 
of simultaneously possessing both positive and negative attitudes about a single attitude 
object (Albertson et al. 2005; Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Armitage and Conner 2000; 
Cacioppo et al. 1997; Craig et al. 2002; McGraw et al. 2003; Newby-Clark et al. 2005; 
Priester and Petty 1996). While the broad definition seems straightforward, within the 
domain of political science scholars, have treated the construct in a variety of diverse ways 
leading to some definitional inconsistencies. Alvarez and Brehm (1995) assert the notion 
that for ambivalence to occur, the conflict must be irreconcilable. Lavine and Steenbergen 
(2005) conclude that group ambivalence, candidate ambivalence, and party ambivalence 
affect related behaviors and attitudes differently, indicating contextual differences based 
on the attitude object. In earlier work, Lavine and colleagues (1998) examine a cognitive-
affective ambivalence, examining the often-ignored affective component of attitudes. 
While Fournier (2005) defines ambivalence as “the extent to which the elements people 
take into account when making a decision push toward opposing positions simultaneously” 
(p. 29) implying a behavioral criterion of information processing for the presence of 
ambivalence. Thus, some indicate that it is cognitive, some effective, and some behavioral. 
These all, though, still fall within the general tripartite approach to attitudes. 
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The variation in conceptualization and measurement (discussed in the next section) 
has produced different and sometimes conflicting results. For example, while many 
scholars find ambivalence to be quite prevalent in American public opinion (Gainous et al. 
2008; Zaller 1992), there is a considerable number that finds ambivalence is much less 
common (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Lavine and Steenbergen 2005; Steenbergen and R. 
Brewer 2004). Even with the variance of results, steadfast through the varied 
conceptualizations is that they all contain the basic notion of the simultaneous possession 
of conflicting evaluations. This consistency in the conceptualization is apparent in the 
numerous approaches to operationalizing ambivalence. The next section makes this point 
clear, while also addressing the relative value of measurement choice
Measuring Ambivalence 
In addition to studying ambivalence as a psychological phenomenon, many 
researchers have been interested in the study of its measurement (Albertson et al. 2005; 
Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Bassili 1996; Gainous 2008; Holbrook and Krosnick 2005; 
Kaplan 1972; Thornton 2011). The measurement of ambivalence can be separated into two 
distinct categories: meta-attitudinal measurements and operative measurements (Bassili 
1996; Gainous 2008; Holbrook and Krosnick 2005). In the most basic sense, meta-
attitudinal measures ask people to evaluate their ambivalence while operative measures 
attempt to gauge it without subjects’ knowledge that ambivalence is being assessed. While 
the preeminent methods for measuring ambivalence are operative measures, both meta-
attitudinal and, operative measures have strengths and weaknesses for measuring 
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ambivalence. The following section examines the use of both methods in the existing 
literature and compares the practical and statistical difference between them
Meta-attitudinal Measurement 
Using a meta-attitudinal approach to measuring ambivalence is straightforward. 
Again, this measurement strategy requires respondents to consider and evaluate their 
ambivalence. One way this is accomplished is by using a Likert scale with simple 
statements about the presence of conflicting attitudes (Gainous 2008). Another standard 
method for collecting meta-attitudinal data on ambivalence is using less direct questions 
like the one used by Mulligan (2002): 
Some people feel that there are only good things or bad things about this issue (a. 
government wiretapping, b. social welfare spending). Their feelings are consistent. 
Other people feel that there are both good things and bad things about this issue. 
Their feelings are inconsistent. Thinking about your own views, would you say that 
your feelings about this issue are extremely consistent, very consistent, somewhat 
consistent, somewhat inconsistent, very inconsistent, or extremely inconsistent? 
While the exact scales and words used to gather meta-attitudinal ambivalence data 
vary, they all rely on the self-report of respondents determine the presence or absence of 
ambivalence.
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Operative Measurement 
Operative measures of ambivalence compromise the favored approach in 
contemporary ambivalence research. The operative measurement of ambivalence uses 
mathematical formulas and indices to transform data collected regarding an attitude object. 
Generally, this data is collected using traditional survey methods, some studies, however, 
include measures of response latency (Bassili 1996; Gainous 2008) – a more non-
traditional survey approach – as well as measures that rely on statistical modeling 
(assessing heteroscedasticity). For those relying on more traditional survey indicators, 
there are three original formulae worth noting: the Kaplan measure, the Katz and Hass 
measure, and the Griffin measure. Most ambivalence research uses the Griffin measure or 
a variant thereof. The remainder of this section summarizes the early development of a 
general operative measurement strategy based largely on a semantic differential strategy 
followed key developments in operationalizing ambivalence using the same foundation. 
Then we discuss the other two other operative measures: response latency and 
heteroscedasticity. Finally, there is a section devoted to research that has compared the 
relative validity of these approaches: meta-attitudinal and operative.  
The Kaplan measure is the first attempt to model an operative measure of 
ambivalence. In seeking to understand the underlying meaning of attitude neutral 
responses, Kaplan (1972) developed a measurement technique to differentiate between 
indifference and ambivalence. In addition to using an operative formula for the 
operationalization of ambivalence, Kaplan also suggested a modification to the use of 
semantic differential scales that allows researchers to collect data that permitted easier 
identification of ambivalence. Rather than using a bipolar scale to measure attitudes, he 
- 11 - 
suggested researchers split the scale at the neutral point and ask respondents to rate the 
positive and negative components of an attitude separately. 
 Kaplan’s formula,𝐴𝑀𝐵 = 𝑇𝐴 − 𝑃𝑂𝐿, models ambivalence as the function of total 
attitude (TA) and the polarization (POL) of the attitude. Total attitude is defined as the total 
positive component plus the absolute value of the negative component, 𝑇𝐴 = 𝐴𝑃 + |𝐴𝑁| 
and polarization is defined as the absolute value of the positive and negative component or 
𝑃𝑂𝐿 = |𝐴𝑝 + 𝐴𝑁|.
While Kaplan’s formula was a critical first step in operationalizing ambivalence, it 
did not accurately measure the construct. Explained as the overlap between the weaker and 
stronger component (Thompson et al. 1995), the formula failed to differentiate between 
degrees of ambivalence while holding the weaker component constant. The more 
significant contribution was his suggestion of splitting the semantic differential scale and 
separately measuring the positive and negative components of an attitude; a method still 
used in contemporary research. 
The Katz and Hass formula sought to correct the conceptual shortcoming of the 
Kaplan’s formula. Using the two-scale method proposed by Kaplan, Katz, and Hass (1988) 
proposed a formula that reflected that ambivalence is stronger when both components are 
equally intense and polar. Rather than modeling ambivalence and the sum of the two 
components, the Katz and Hass formula models ambivalence as the absolute value of the 
product of the positive and negative components or |𝐴𝑀𝐵| = 𝐴𝜌 ∗ 𝐴𝑁. While this 
operationalization corrected the problem in Kaplan’s definition, it also fell short of 
capturing ambivalence as conceptualized. Since ambivalence occurs when evaluations are 
similar in intensity, but opposed in valence, a response pair of (1,1) should receive a higher 
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ambivalence score than a response pair of (1,4). Using this formula, however, the resulting 
ambivalence scores would be a 1 and 4 respectively. 
The final formula worth noting is the Griffin formula. Whereas the previous two 
formulae were steps toward creating a valid operative measure of ambivalence, the Griffin 
formula accomplished the task. When developing the formula, Griffin directly included the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for ambivalence: similarity and intensity. The formula, 
𝐴𝑀𝐵 = (𝐴𝑃 + 𝐴𝑁)/2 − |𝐴𝑃 − 𝐴𝑁| results in an index that accounts for both the
differences in score combinations and accurately represents the conceptualization of 
ambivalence. Although all three of these examples vary in their validity, they share a 
standard method2. 
-Table 2.1- 
The data used in the calculation of their respective ambivalence scores were 
gathered using a modified semantic differential scale. While Kaplan’s formula did not 
accurately capture the simultaneous possession of positive and negative evaluations, 
ambivalent attitudes, his suggestion to split the semantic differential scale was incredibly 
valuable. His effort distinguishes between respondents who felt neither positively or 
negatively and those who felt both positively and negatively and led to a method still used 
today. Simply by asking respondents to evaluate separately, the positive and negative 
components of an object relative to a neutral point, it became possible for researchers to 
develop the other discussed algorithms and move toward a more accurate measure than 
adequately separates ambivalent attitudes from those that are, indifferent or neutral. 
2 See Table 2.1 for a summary 
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Another way that scholars have attempted to measure ambivalence is by assessing 
response latency. Bassili (1996) argued that because some attitudes are more potentially 
conflictual, or characterized by ambivalence than others, it might take longer for 
respondents to access and state their opinion. Therefore, the amount of time that passes 
between being asked to respond to a survey indicator of an attitude object, and responding 
to it, is measured with the idea that the longer it takes, the more “potential ambivalence” 
exists (Newby-Clark et al. 2005). 
Bassili’s (1996) work is centered broadly on attitude strength as opposed to 
specifically on ambivalence, but it provides the operational foundation of using response 
latency as an indicator of ambivalence. Albertson, Brehm, and Alvarez (2005) directly 
examine response latency regarding responses to questions about two policy categories 
(affirmative action and welfare). Their results suggested that other measures (operative in 
particular) performed better, but also with caveats and limitations; namely, they argue that 
simultaneously holding positive and negative evaluations does not necessarily signify 
ambivalence. Their contention is that there must be some difficulty in settling the conflict 
if, indeed, these conflicting evaluations are ambivalence. 
Alvarez and Brehm (1995) used yet another operative measure of ambivalence. 
They inferred ambivalence from patterns of error variance, the heteroscedasticity, in a 
regression model (see also de Vries and Steenbergen 2013; Jacoby 2002): a probit model 
of binary choice. The argument is that error variance across individuals indicates the 
presence of ambivalence within individuals. However, there are limitations to such 
inferences about an individual-level concept (ambivalence) based upon aggregate-level 
data (error variance) are problematic. Error variance is high, by definition, when a more 
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substantial proportion of people are not predicted accurately by the binary choice model, 
whereas ambivalence exists when an individual person holds both positive and negative 
feelings about an issue. High error variance may indeed be, in part, a result of ambivalence, 
and the results of Alvarez and Brehm’s research give us reason to believe that it probably 
is to some degree. However, this still does not allow us to infer if any one individual is 
ambivalent. Error variances in the binary choice model may be a function of non-attitudes, 
uncertainty, equivocation, or a host of other factors as well. 
Measurement Comparison 
Several studies have been conducted measuring the comparative validity of 
ambivalence measurement strategies (Bassili 1996; Gainous 2008; Holbrook and Krosnick 
2005; Thompson et al. 1995). In addition to comparing the two different categories of 
measurement strategies, meta-attitudinal and operative, Gainous (2008), Thompson 
(1995), and to a lesser degree Bassili (1996), compare the validity of various operative 
measures of ambivalence. The collective results of these studies suggest several key 
findings described below. 
Bassili (1996) uses a factor analysis to compare various meta-attitudinal measures 
of attitude strength and the operative measures of extremity, ambivalence, and response 
latency. Looking at the issues of work quotas for women, censorship of pornography, and 
censorship of hate speech, he finds that meta-attitudinal and operative measures 
consistently cluster onto two factors. This finding suggests that meta-attitudinal and 
operative measures of attitude strength are measuring different constructs of these issues. 
Based on the factor analyses, Bassili continues by creating separate indices for the two 
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measurement classes and running logistical regression models for a dichotomous variable 
of attitude pliability for all issues. In the model comprised of both indices, the meta-
attitudinal index failed to reach statistical significance, whereas the operative index was 
statistically significant in all three cases. Further, in the models comprised of only the meta-
attitudinal index, only the model for predicting the pliability of hate speech censorship 
performed well. 
In a second, similarly structured study, Bassili (1996) found similar results between 
meta-attitudinal and operative measures of attitude strength. Additionally, the second study 
contained both a meta-attitudinal and operative measure of ambivalence. A correlation test 
found no relationship between the two measures. 
Others have also compared meta-attitudinal and operative measures of ambivalence 
with similar results (Gainous 2008; Holbrook and Krosnick 2005). Using three meta-
attitudinal measures and two operative measures of ambivalence the Holbrook and 
Krosnick, created two structural equation models. In one model, all five indicators were 
treated as indicators of a single latent construct, while the second model treated the meta-
attitudinal and operative indicators as measuring their own respective latent constructs. 
Using various tests of model fit, Holbrook and Krosnick compared the two models across 
the issues of abortion and capital punishment. Consistent with Bassili’s findings, the single 
construct model did not fit for either issue while the two-construct model was a good fit 
for both issues. The authors then used a model proposed by Kenny and Judd (1984) to 
compute factor scores for the two-construct ambivalence structural equation model and 
used these scores to estimate resistance, information gathering, the false consensus effect, 
perceptions of media bias, candidate evaluations, and activism. They found here that the 
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meta-attitudinal ambivalence and operative ambivalence had different effects on these 
political outcomes. Of the ten relationships tested, only three produced results statistically 
significant and correlated in the same direction for both measures. These findings suggest 
that meta-attitudinal ambivalence and operative ambivalence work differently depending 
on the context. 
Gainous (2008) finds that between one meta-attitudinal measure and two operative 
measures of social welfare ambivalence, only a weak relationship exists between the two 
operative measures. This finding supports the findings of other scholars that there is not a 
relationship between meta-attitudinal measures and operative measures of ambivalence, 
and that when such correlations are present, they appear to be marginal at best. Gainous’ 
conclusion regarding the relative validity of the different measures is that the operative 
measures that force respondents evaluate the positive and negative components of an 
attitude object are the most effective predictors of ambivalence. 
In sum, research regarding the relative validity of the two measurement classes 
indicates key findings. First, meta-attitudinal measures and operative measures are 
measuring different constructs. Bassili (1996) suggests the reason for this is meta-
attitudinal measures are capturing evaluations of attitude properties while operative 
measures are capturing the actual ambivalent properties. Further, the correlations between 
the different measurements of ambivalence tend to be weak or non-existent in most cases. 
Second, when comparing the validity of the measurement strategies, the operative 
measurements of ambivalence tend to be the superior predictor of ambivalence. 
In addition to studying the validity between meta-attitudinal and operative 
measurement strategies, some scholars have focused on comparing the validity of operative 
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measures. Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995) compare four formulae used to construct 
operative ambivalence scores, the Kaplan index, the Katz index, the Jamieson index, and 
the Griffin index. Their findings suggest that the Jamieson and Griffin index are the most 
accurate methods to measure ambivalence as commonly defined. Thornton (2011) assesses 
the level of measurement of operative measures using researcher inferences from open-
ended survey questions and asserts that such measures should be coded categorically to 
increase measurement validity. Gainous (2008) concludes that the heteroscedastic model 
is insufficient due to ambiguity regarding the causes of variance and discrepancies between 
the level of observation and level of measurement. 
In conclusion, the measurement of ambivalence has received a great deal of 
attention. The findings suggest that in most cases, the most effective way to measure the 
phenomenon of the simultaneous possession of positive and negative evaluative 
dispositions about an attitude object is using the split semantic differential method 
combined with the Griffin formula. While this may be true in most cases, there are some 
circumstances in which other methods are appropriate. For example, if one chose to include 
the criteria of irreconcilable internalized conflict, the addition of a meta-attitudinal 
measurement, or an inferential operative measure of open-ended questions, would allow 
researchers to identify when the presence of an ambivalent state results in affective conflict. 
Further, research is often constrained by practical limitations. Using the split semantic 
differential method requires, at least, two questions to measure one attitude doubling the 
resources required to collect data. 
Depending on the relative importance of ambivalence to a specific research 
question and the practical restrictions on data collection, the most appropriate method for 
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measuring ambivalence may be meta-attitudinal, operative, of a combination thereof. No 
single method has been shown to be universally superior. However, thanks to the prior 
research of scholars, a considerable amount of research exists to aid in determining the 
appropriate method of measurement for future research.
Political Consequences of Ambivalence 
It should be no surprise that the political consequences of ambivalence are the most 
studied area within political science ambivalence research. After all, political science is 
concerned with political outcomes. It is in this section, where the relationship of 
ambivalence to political decision-making is clearest. While much of the discussion up to 
this point has focused on the individual and largely psychological consequences of 
attitudinal ambivalence, ambivalence also affects political behavior. In addition to the 
direct role of ambivalence on attitude expression, ambivalent attitudes have been shown to 
increase susceptibility to influence (Armitage and Conner 2000; Hodson et al. 2001; Lavine 
et al. 2012), affect the rate of political participation (Mulligan 2011; Yoo 2010), and 
increase variance in vote choice (Basinger and Lavine 2005; Lavine et al. 2012; Lavine 
and Steenbergen 2005; Mulligan 2011; Thornton 2014), among other decision-making 
consequences. 
Early research suggested that ambivalence plays a role in shaping citizens' feelings 
about their national leaders. Abelson and his colleagues (1982) found that positive and 
negative affective reactions toward candidates clustered on separate factors; or, in other 
words, their reactions formed two factors that were not significantly correlated with one 
another. Thus, having good feelings toward a candidate did not necessarily imply an 
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absence of bad feelings toward them. Subsequent research suggests that ambivalence also 
affects the manner in which attitudes translate into behavior (Armitage and Conner 2000). 
Lavine and Steenbergen (2005) present evidence of this by showing that conflict rooted in 
feelings toward liberal and conservative social groups can influence citizens’ voting 
decisions. 
Evidence also suggests that ambivalence mediates political evaluations (McGraw 
et al. 2003), and the relationship between a person's policy preferences and his or her 
evaluations of political leaders and institutions (Craig et al. 2005). For example, in an 
experiment, Haddock (2003) tests the degree to which candidate and party evaluations are 
linked among those that are ambivalent about British politics in general. He used a direct 
measure of ambivalence that simply asked subjects if they were mixed or ambivalent. The 
results indicated that the correlation between evaluations of the Prime Minister and the 
party were highest when participants evaluated them together rather than separately and 
that this correlation was strongest for those who were ambivalent. Other studies have 
demonstrated that more negative evaluations of candidates are associated with ambivalence 
(Craig et al. 2003; McGraw et al. 2003). 
While most research on ambivalence within political science is situated in the 
domestic American context, Erisen and Erisen (2014) examined political ambivalence in 
Europe. Using data from the Eurobarometer, they looked at public opinion regarding 
Turkey’s membership into the European Union in 2006. Using three-domain pairs, 
economy– security, immigration–security, and population–culture, they find that EU 
citizens were moderately ambivalent about Turkey’s proposed ascension into the EU. They 
also found that ambivalent individuals in this study were more likely to support Turkey’s 
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membership into the European Union. Research has also suggested that consequences of 
ambivalence extend beyond individual-level evaluative effects. It has been hypothesized 
that ambivalence, like other attributes such as importance, extremity, and certainty, will 
moderate the stability of attitudes over time (Armitage and Conner 2000; Bassili 1996; 
Kane et al. 2001). The evidence, however, is decidedly mixed. Some have concluded that 
ambivalence does contribute to attitude instability or susceptibility (Bargh et al. 1992; 
Craig et al. 2005; Fournier 2005; Hill and Kriesi 2001), while other research has failed to 
uncover such a link (Armitage and Conner 2000, 2005; Bassili 1996; Zaller and Feldman 
1992). 
When it comes to the relationship between ambivalence and political decision-
making, perhaps, the strongest evidence that this relationship is consequential is that 
demonstrating a connection centered on actual political engagement. On this front, there is 
evidence that ambivalence can condition political participation (Yoo 2010) partisanship 
(Lavine et al. 2012) and vote choice (Basinger and Lavine 2005; Mulligan 2011) (Thornton 
2014). 
Yoo (2010) goes back to the very foundation of early ambivalence research to build 
a framework for understanding why ambivalence should matter for the decision to 
participate, specifically the decision to vote. He argues that attitudinal research still largely 
fails to distinguish between two types of neutrality: ambivalence and indifference. He then 
makes a straightforward and convincing argument that ambivalent citizens should turn out 
to vote at higher rates than indifferent citizens because prior research concluded that 
ambivalent are motivated to seek and process information intensively (Bell and Esses 
2002). The contention is that ambivalent citizens will not sit idly when confronted with the 
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psychological conflict that is ambivalence. The indifferent are often apolitical, while the 
ambivalent have an affective connection to the political contest. As a result, they should be 
more likely to vote than the indifferent. Yoo (2010) uses American National Election 
Studies data to show, first, that this is, indeed, the case. Then this result is extended to 
political participation more generally, with the evidence indicating that the ambivalent are 
more likely than the indifferent to engage in various campaign activities. 
While evidence that ambivalence conditions the decision to participate clearly 
demonstrates that it is consequential for our understanding of political decision-making 
generally, there is perhaps no more meaningful decision in a democratic society than the 
decision on how to cast one’s vote. Here, too, research has provided solid evidence that 
ambivalence can influence vote choice. The foundation of political behavior scholarship is 
rooted in The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960), where they argued that citizens’ 
attachment to political parties ultimately shaped all of their political decisions. They 
perceived the world around them through a partisan lens. While Basinger and Lavine 
(2005) do not suggest that this is not the case, they do argue that voters who are ambivalent 
about political parties reduce their reliance on partisanship to come to a decision on whom 
to vote for in U.S. House elections. In The Ambivalent Partisan: How Critical Loyalty 
Promotes Democracy (2012) Lavine and colleagues find that individuals who express 
positive and negative attitudes towards both parties are more likely to change their partisan 
identity. Casting doubt on the dominance of partisanship in the political decision-making 
process. Others continue this line of research arguing that citizens with partisan 
ambivalence are more likely to split-ticket vote in congressional elections (Mulligan 2011), 
and while Thornton (2014) demonstrates that the indifferent are more likely than the 
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ambivalent about defecting (vote for a candidate who does not share their party 
identification) in presidential elections, he does provide evidence that ambivalent partisans 
will defect under certain conditions.
Sources of Ambivalence 
If understanding the effects of ambivalence is important to political scientists, it is 
equally important to understand the conditions that inhibit or encourage ambivalence. 
Although a considerable amount of research has been conducted investigating the 
consequences of ambivalence for political decision-making, little has been done to uncover 
the root causes of ambivalence (Keele and Wolak 2008). Contrary to the mixed evidence 
from social psychology research (Conner and Armitage 2008), the assumption that the 
causes of ambivalence are rooted in individual differences in attitude strength and political 
knowledge is common (Keele and Wolak 2008). Given the mounting evidence that 
ambivalence has significant consequences for political decision-making (Basinger and 
Lavine 2005; Craig et al. 2002; Gainous and Martinez 2005; Huckfeldt et al. 2004b; Kim 
et al. 2013; McGraw et al. 2003; Mulligan 2011; Mutz 2002; Thornton 2014; Yoo 2010), 
examining the conditions in which ambivalence occurs is necessary. 
While individual differences such as political knowledge, value conflict, and 
personality traits are often treated as sources of ambivalence, recent research indicates 
environmental factors such as political context (Keele and Wolak 2008; Singh and 
Thornton 2016; Thornton 2013) and information and social networks (Huckfeldt et al. 
2004b; Mutz 2002; Rudolph 2005), also contribute to the occurrence of ambivalence. This 
section examines the individual, environmental, and network-based sources of 
ambivalence to help predict those who are most likely to possess ambivalent attitudes. 
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Value Conflict 
Of the individual level root causes of ambivalence, value conflict is the 
predominant antecedent in the literature (Steenbergen and R. Brewer 2004). The idea is 
that ambivalence will occur in evaluative circumstances where the attitude object forces 
two or more of an individual’s core values to be in opposition to one another (Alvarez and 
Brehm 1995; Craig et al. 2003; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Katz and Hass 1988). Core values 
represent overarching normative principles and belief assumptions (McCann 1997) that are 
part of an individual’s social and personal identity (Olson and Kendrick 2012). While value 
conflict as a principle cause of ambivalence is prevalent in the literature, Craig and 
colleagues contend that the empirical evidence supporting this assumption is limited. 
Although the empirical evidence for value conflict-driven ambivalence is limited, 
concordant findings suggest value conflict as a source of ambivalence (Craig and Martinez 
2004; Craig et al. 2005; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Martinez et al. 2005). For this study, I 
have chosen to model value conflict as a form of ambivalence. 
The political culture in the United States has been fraught with conflicting values 
about government and society since its founding (Feldman and Zaller 1992) as evidenced 
by the Federalist Papers and even the Constitution. Several of the founding principles of 
American democracy are grounded in conflicting sets of values. Many values associated 
with democracy and capitalism may, at times, be found in conflict with one another 
(McClosky and Zaller 1984), while at the same time competing with egalitarian values 
(Gainous and Martinez 2005). The complex set of American values in combination with 
historically contentious policy domains have provided scholars a rich environment to study 
value conflict as a source of ambivalence. 
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Feldman and Zaller (1992) examine the value conflict between support for the 
welfare state and nineteenth-century liberalism. Using two questions about social welfare 
and an attached open-ended question from the 1987 National Election Studies survey data, 
Feldman and Zaller assess respondents’ answers against their open-ended elaboration. 
They conclude that on the issues of social welfare policy, social welfare liberals tend to be 
more ambivalent and that this ambivalence is the result of value conflict derived from a 
political culture inhospitable to the welfare state. 
In a poll of Florida residents, Martinez (2005) found the support that individuals 
with reported value conflicts were more likely to be ambivalent regarding gay rights issues. 
Specifically, for gay rights issues relating to military service, privacy, job discrimination, 
and health insurance, those with value conflict between the values of egalitarianism and 
traditional lifestyle roles tended to be more ambivalent. Further, for gay rights issues 
regarding teaching school, legal marriage, adopting children, and joining the Boy Scouts, 
respondents with value conflict between egalitarianism and traditional marriage roles were 
found to be more ambivalent. 
While values and attitudes are very clearly treated at different constructs within 
political science and across disciplines, in this study, I treat value conflict as a form of 
attitudinal ambivalence. I contented that, absent the time criteria and hierarchical nature of 
values, the two concepts have very similar outwardly expressions in human behavior.
Political Knowledge 
General attitude theory treats topic relevant knowledge of an attitude object as an 
indicator of attitude strength (Ajzen 2001; Kallgren and Wood 1986). Political scientists 
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have long been interested in the relationship between political knowledge and various 
attitudinal states. In many cases, political knowledge is treated as a component and 
indicator of political sophistication, or an individual’s ability to gather and process 
politically relevant information (Craig et al. 2005; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Feldman 
1988; Luskin 1987; Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992). Political sophistication influences 
many of the same behavioral and decision-making processes that are of interest in 
ambivalence research. Some examples include issue-based voting (Luskin et al. 2005), 
ideological/political attitude consistency (Jacoby 1995; Judd and Downing 1990; Judd and 
Krosnick 1989), and attitude change (Zaller 1992). 
Ambivalence research has theorized that political knowledge both increases and 
reduces ambivalence. Using political knowledge and level of education as indicators of 
political sophistication McGraw et al. (2003) finds that those with less interest and 
knowledge in politics were more likely to experience meta-attitudinal ambivalence and 
uncertainty when evaluating candidates. In a more consequential finding for the purpose 
of this study, McGraw and colleagues found that the on-line processing of information, 
which has been shown by a variety of scholars to produce more consistent judgments (Kim 
and Garrett 2012; Lodge and Taber 2007; Rudolph and Popp 2007; Kim 2009), is 
especially effective for the highly educated. Against a similar theoretical backdrop 
Rudolph (2011) finds that political knowledge, operationalized as an indicator of 
systematic information processing, increased operative ambivalence among weak partisans 
while reducing operative ambivalence for strong partisans in candidate evaluations. 
Early research regarding models of information processing often positioned 
theories of memory-based processing and on-line processing (Tormala and Petty 2001) as 
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opposing explanations for attitude formation. However, more contemporary research treats 
both models as part of the evaluative process (Kim 2009; Lodge and Taber 2007; Kim and 
Garrett 2012; Kim 2012). Memory-based processing refers to the process in which people 
based their evaluations on information stored in an individual’s long-term memory (Zaller 
1992). Conversely, theories of on-line information processing attribute attitudes to a 
running tally of affective cues for processing and evaluating new information (Kim and 
Garrett 2012; Kim 2009) and asserts that judgments are made in spontaneously, as needed. 
While the existing research provides an insight into the potential relationship 
between political knowledge and ambivalence, the field would benefit from further 
research into this relationship. The general scholarship of political knowledge and political 
sophistication is vast, and the theoretical backdrop of information processing and attitude 
change provide a strong starting point for additional research.
Context/Political Environment 
Another antecedent to ambivalence found in the literature is the condition of the 
political environment. Research suggests that attributes of political environments such as 
the electoral system (Singh and Thornton 2016), the competitiveness of the electoral 
district (Keele and Wolak 2008), and the nature of the political information available to the 
electorate (Huckfeldt et al. 2004b; Thornton 2013; de Vries and Steenbergen 2013) affect 
the probability for an individual to be ambivalent. 
Concerned about both the lack of empirically verified causes of ambivalence and 
the domains focus on individual-level causes, Keele and Wolak (2008) wanted to answer 
whether ambivalence could result from the makeup of the political environment. Reasoning 
- 27 - 
that the political environment in battleground states differs from non-competitive partisan 
states during presidential campaigning, the study utilizes a quasi-experimental research 
design to compare the contextual causes of ambivalence. Using the battleground states as 
the treatment group and the non-battleground states as the control, the authors expected to 
find more ambivalence in battleground states. The variables of concern for this study were 
the distribution of partisanship among the electorate, and the content and balance of elite 
messaging. Based on expectations from prior research (Beck et al. 2002; Krassa 1990), 
Keele and Wolak (2008) expected these variables to contribute to a more heterogeneous 
information environment leading to increased levels of ambivalent attitudes. The treatment 
results indicate that ceteris paribus, there was a one-quarter point increase on the 
ambivalence scale for the treatment group. Following the confirmatory findings, they 
created a multilevel model to confirm whether the contextual effects on ambivalence 
occurred on individual-level outcomes. While the results of their study showed that 
individual-level indicators are significantly stronger predictors of ambivalence, they also 
offered evidence that there are, indeed, contextual sources of ambivalence. 
Keele and Wolak’s examination of contextual sources of ambivalence contributed 
three important findings to the study of ambivalence. First, it supported the existing use of 
individual-level sources of ambivalence. Second, it confirmed that the understanding of 
ambivalence is still incomplete and that contextual factors can affect the presence of 
ambivalence in individuals. Finally, it identifies competition in presidential ads, and the 
diversity in an individual’s social network are potential sources of ambivalence. 
In another study using post-election survey data from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems, Singh and Thornton contend that coalition comprised of ideologically 
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dissimilar parties are more likely to generate ambivalence and that the effect of this 
ambivalence is low evaluations of democratic performance for electoral winners (Singh 
and Thornton 2016). The results of their study conclude that ideologically dissonant 
coalitions increase coalition ambivalence. In the parliamentary electoral context, this 
coalition ambivalence lowers attitudes about external efficacy and feelings of 
representation. 
Thornton (2013) examined the impact of increased elite polarization on the 
influence of partisanship on vote choice and attitudes. He asserts that heightened elite 
polarization increases both polarized and ambivalent attitudes, while it reduces attitudes 
classified as indifferent. The argument is that the increase in elite polarization causes 
increased attention from the electorate, resulting in a denser information environment, and 
increasing the number of positive and negative opinions in public. Using data from the 
American National Election Studies, Thornton shows that from 1980 to 2004 the number 
of one-side individuals and ambivalent individuals increased from 42% to 47% and from 
22% to 29% respectively. Conversely, the number of indifferent individuals decreased 
from 34% to 23% in the same period.
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Cross-Cutting Information/Conflicting Networks/Groups 
The last domain of sources of ambivalence to be discussed represents a middle 
ground between the individual and contextual sources of ambivalence; cross-cutting 
information and conflicting social and political networks. This area of ambivalence 
research is interested in understanding how individual characteristics interact with social 
and political conditions to better understand the general conditions that attenuate or 
exacerbate ambivalent attitudes. 
In a study examining the consequences of politically heterogeneous social networks 
on ambivalence and engagement, Huckfeldt and colleagues (2004a; 2004b) find that the 
size and political diversity of an individual’s social network enhance the potential for 
ambivalence. However, this relationship is complex. Their findings suggest that the 
disagreement between an individual and their network associates does not produce 
discernable effects for turnout but that as a disagreement between members of their 
network increases, political interest decreases. In a similar study examining political 
participation, Mutz (2002) finds both contradicting and concordant evidence regarding 
dissonant information networks. 
In Mutz’s study, cross-cutting information networks share a similar positive 
correlation with ambivalence about candidate preference. In contrast, however, Mutz finds 
that exposure to these dissonant networks has a negative impact on voting behavior. An 
additional finding worth noting is the effect of the interaction between cross-cutting 
exposure and ambivalence on conflict-avoidant individuals. When the effects of social 
accountability and ambivalence are accounted for, the size of the effects of cross-cutting 
exposures drops to nearly zero. 
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Lastly, in a study examining claims that public opinion toward European 
integration had experienced a decisive turn towards unfavourability, de Vries and 
Steenbergen (2013) look at the effects of contextual, cross-cutting, and individual-level 
factors on European public opinion. They assert that response variability in public opinion 
data is an indicator of ambivalent mass publics. Using a heteroskedastic probit model, they 
find several results consistent with the findings of Huckfelt and Mutz. De Vries and 
Steenbergen find that duration of state membership in the EU and perceived party 
differences have significant curvilinear effects on response variability, while dense media 
environments and vague party cues regarding European integration had significant positive 
effects on response variability. Also, worth noting were two findings regarding individual-
level factors. Political knowledge failed to produce any meaningful effect on the level of 
response variability, and the simultaneous possession of national and European identity 
reduced response variability.
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Digital Information Consumption as a Moderator of Ambivalence 
Before making presenting my argument and predictions about the relationship 
between digital political information consumption and ambivalent political attitudes, it is 
necessary to discuss three more topics. To place my expectation in context, I will now 
briefly discuss some of the political communication literature in terms of the political 
consequences that are already known to political communications scholars. One area of 
research that has been exceptionally active over the last decade is that examining the effects 
the internet, and web-related technologies, have on our political landscape. The traditional 
cleavage between scholars regarding the study of the internet has been whether the internet 
provides an opportunity for those at the bottom of the sociopolitical strata to have a louder 
voice in the political process. While this cleavage has become less evident in recent years, 
history has undoubtedly shown that the internet can both accelerate and inhibit 
sociopolitical mobility. 
 Some of the more prolific cases of the internet as a force for good were the 
revolutions of the Arab Spring and the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine (Kyj 2006; 
Hänska Ahy 2016; Onuch 2015; Rane and Salem 2012). Conversely, the internet has also 
made it easier for the Chinese government and  American government to spy on its citizens 
(Healy 2007; Thorne and Kouzmin 2010), for ISIS to recruit new members (Awan 2017) 
and for private industry (Isaak and Hanna 2018) and hostile states to manipulate the 
American electoral process (Mueller 2019 ). These dynamics are the result of three primary 
structural differences between traditional media and internet media, 1) the internet has 
reduced the degree in which elites are situated as gatekeepers, 2) the internet has given the 
consumer significantly more power to choose what information to consume, and 3) the 
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volume of data available to those with the money or knowledge to obtain it (Gainous and 
Wagner 2014; Wagner and Gainous 2013; Cappella et al. 2015). The open nature of the 
internet has created a media environment that hybridizes not only traditional media 
environments but also introduces innovative ways in which the consumer can select, 
redistribute information, or even produce their own (Chadwick 2017; Gainous and Wagner 
2014; Cappella et al. 2015).It is these facets of the internet, which are important for 
structuring the argument that increased internet use will reduce attitudinal ambivalence. 
In addition, the literature discussed, there two other concepts pertinent to 
expectations about how the internet will affect its users. Cognitive dissonance theory and 
selective exposure assert that individuals will seek to avoid cognitive discomfort by 
selecting information compatible with their existing attitudes (Cappella et al. 2015; 
Festinger 1962; Fischer et al. 2005; Fischer et al. 2008b; Gainous and Wagner 2014). 
Though cognitive dissonance theory refers to the discomfort produced by engaging in 
counter-attitudinal behavior (van Harreveld et al. 2009), the assumptions of internal 
conflict resolution are near identical, and perhaps more consistent with information 
consumption When individuals experience a recognizably internally inconsistent state, 
they will seek to bring the state into consonance. 
One way in which individuals can avoid these unpleasant states is by avoiding 
counter attitudinal information and selectively consuming. The literature regarding 
selective exposure has uncovered several factors which interact with the tendency to select 
confirmatory information. Threat cues (Fischer et al. 2011), information scarcity (Fischer 
et al. 2008b), self-regulation capacities (Fischer et al. 2008a) and the type of evaluation 
being made (Fischer et al. 2010), all affect the rate of which individuals engage in selective 
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exposure. The summative findings of these studies indicate that cognitive investment in 
evaluative tasks increases reliance on weighting information based on their congruence 
with previously held attitudes or evaluations. 
Compounding the human tendency to seek internally consistent cognitive states, 
are the econometric algorithms of contemporary web services. These algorithms are 
designed to learn user preferences from input data and curate consumer-preferred outputs. 
As individuals engage with various forms of data online, algorithms become more precise 
in providing the user with similar content initiating positive user/system feedback loops. 
Relative to pre-internet forms of political communication, the internet fundamentally 
changes the relationship between political message and the receiver’s cognitions and 
related affective memories. Prior to the internet, political messaging required a significant 
amount of resources, were relatively infrequent, and less accurately targeted. Online, 
however, if a user interacts with political messages, which can be readily accessed, the 
chances of encountering additional political messages will increase. Further, if the 
interaction is sustained the chances of encountering politically congruent information will 
continue to increase. 
This literature review primarily focused on the measurement, consequences, and 
sources of ambivalent political attitudes. Many of the sources of ambivalence covered in 
this chaptered are by-products of the less forgiving physical, political environment. The 
internet provides users an environment which is less strictly bounded by social norms, is 
designed to homogenize information flows and is rich in the amount of information 
available. These characteristics make it easier to both avoid and resolve ambivalent 
attitudinal states. 
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 Behavioral researchers have begun to embrace the idea that many people have 
mixed feelings, or they are ambivalent, about political issues. They do not necessarily have 
a single “true” attitude on these issues, but rather a store of multiple and sometimes 
conflicting attitudes that they might draw upon at any given time when making a decision. 
Simply, they may simultaneously possess positive and negative evaluations of a single 
attitude object, and this can structure the behavioral choices they make. 
The findings discussed in this section of the literature, when paired with the 
characteristics of the internet, provide an extremely insightful backdrop for the 
forthcoming analysis. As was mentioned in the introduction, the internet has fundamentally 
changed the nature of the political information environment. The ability to seek, produce, 
or be exposed to political messaging has never been greater. And while several studies 
found (Singh and Thornton 2016; Huckfeldt et al. 2004b; Thornton 2013; Keele and Wolak 
2008; de Vries and Steenbergen 2013) that ambivalence increases as exposure to cross-
cutting  information and social networks increases, the user experience-centric nature of 
the internet permits individuals to opt-out of those networks in favor of congruent 
information flows. 
Although individuals may experience value ambivalence due to content 
encountered on the web or in everyday life, the nature of the internet should reduce the 
occurrence of exposure to conflicting information. Additionally, between the strength of 
on-line judgments and the diverse exposure of information from which to update evaluative 
schemas in one’s long-term memory, paired with the nature of the internet should further 
reduce the possibility of experiencing ambivalent political attitudes. For those with access 
to the internet, and a willingness to engage political information, there exists a seemingly 
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unlimited library to pull from. Unlike the cross-cutting information environments of 
physical, social networks, the low cost of the internet allows users to select, from an infinite 
playlist, the information that best fits their user experience. 
Individuals seeking information online are likely doing so because they are 
motivated by preference to do so. As a result, they are likely cognitively invested in any 
evaluations they are making and have a greater likelihood of selectively consuming attitude 
consistent information. Further, individuals surfing the net are removed from the 
threatening contexts and are exposed to few pressures from social norms, thus increasing 
their cognitive engagement. Finally, internet content algorithms, human tendency to 
socially self-sort with like-minded others, and the nearly cost-free process of consuming 
information online increase exposure to confirmatory stimuli, creating a voluminous online 
tally of attitude consistent information evaluations strengthening overall evaluations of 
attitude objects. 
The result is an information environment which, by chance or design, seeks to 
reduce the amount of effort required to situate one’s political information flow within a 
politically homogenous environment.  With many of the sources of ambivalence moderated 
by the characteristics of the internet, I expect internet use to be negatively correlated with 
the ambivalence measures discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III: DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
While most studies focus intentionally on a specific type of ambivalence, in this 
study, I am focused on the relationship between digital information consumption and 
ambivalence, generally. The data for this study comes from the American National Election 
Studies 2016 elections survey, a survey that has been administered since the 1940s, and is 
designed to be representative of the voting-age population of the United States’ electorate 
(ANES 2016). From these data, I constructed measures of ambivalence based upon 
examples from the literature; one measure of partisan ambivalence, a measure of candidate 
ambivalence, and one measure of value ambivalence, and one measure of group 
ambivalence. I created all four measures using the operative measurement strategy of 
constructing an ambivalence index using indirect methods to derive positive and negative 
evaluations about each respective attitude object.
Digital Political Information Consumption 
To test the relationship between consuming political information online and 
ambivalence, I constructed a digital political information consumption index (DPI). The 
ANES 2016 time series data contain several internet use questions within the context of 
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political information gathering. To maximize variability for the measure, I constructed the 
index from utilizing seven questions from both rounds of the ANES 2016 data. 
Two of the questions measure respondents access to the internet by asking if there 
is internet use in the respondent’s household, and if the respondent owns a smartphone. 
The remaining questions measure the respondent’s use of the internet to gather campaign-
related information. From the pre-election administration of the survey respondents are 
asked to identify which media formats they use to learn about the presidential campaign, 
and how many days a week the use social media to learn about the campaign. The post-
election survey questions ask respondents if they have a Facebook account and if they have 
used that account the in the previous month, if they used social media to send a political 
message, and how many times they used the internet to learn about the presidential 
campaign. 
Together, these variables provide sufficient indicators to build an index measuring 
both the respondents’ capacity to gather political information online and their tendency to 
use the internet for political information gathering. The standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.7 indicates that these items scale well together, and all seven items were included in the 
index to create the independent variable. Prior to constructing the index, all seven items 
were scaled to range from zero to one as was the resulting index. 
-Table 3.1- 
The DPI index has a µ=0.67 and σ=0.25. Looking at the data, the strongest 
deviation from the mean occurs in the portion of the population ages 65 and older. The 
mean DPI score for those 65 and older are µ=0.53 with a standard deviation of σ=0.26.
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Partisan Ambivalence 
The most common example of this type of measure in political science in the 
measurement of partisan ambivalence (Lavine et al. 2012; Thornton 2013; Greene 2005; 
Lavine 2001; Thornton 2011). This measure is constructed using the number of given likes 
and dislikes for the two major political parties in the United States. The 2016 ANES survey 
asks respondents a series of question regarding their likes and dislikes about the two major 
political parties in the United States. The questions prompting open-ended responses come 
in the form of two questions. The first question asks, “Is there anything R likes about 
Democratic (Republican) Party?” Affirmative responses are then prompted to detail their 
specific praises and criticism with “Anything else you (dis)like about the Democratic 
(Republican) Party?” until they respond with a ‘no.’ 
To test the relationship between digital political information consumption and 
partisan ambivalence, I replicated this popular measure of ambivalence index Partisan 
ambivalence is measured traditionally using a variation of the Griffin index mentioned 
earlier. Partisan ambivalence, measured using  the formula, PartisanAMB=  
(𝐷+𝑅)
2
 − |D − 𝑅|
where 𝐷 =
(𝑃𝐷+𝑁𝑅)
2
 measures the total evaluative position for the Democratic Party  and 
𝑅 =
(𝑃𝑅+𝑁𝐷)
2
3  measures the total evaluative position for Republicans. The first term of the 
PartisanAMB, 
(𝐷+𝑅)
2
, measures how similar a respondent’s partisan evaluative positions are, 
while the second term measures the extremity of the similarity. Thus, if D = 5 and R =5 the 
3  The Pr, Pd, Nr, Nd refer to the number of positive and negative comments regarding the 
respective parties 
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respondent’s similarity of affect towards both parties will be 5 and the extremity of the 
similarity will be 0, the respondent a maximum ambivalence score of 5. 
While some scholars have relied on the coded counts produced by the ANES staff, 
for this 2016 survey, the responses were not coded. In order to construct this index, I 
reviewed all of the open-ended responses to the party likes and dislike and produced counts 
for each sperate statement given for the respective questions. To replicate this measure as 
closely as possible, I capped the maximum number of statements a 5. While there is no 
accurate measure for a response coded by a single investigator, the lack of such a measure 
does not warrant dropping the index4. As mentioned by Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 
(2012), the weakness of this measure is the disproportionate number of non-responses. 
-Figure 3.1- 
As figure 3.1 shows, even when examing the distribution of likes and dislikes within 
the context of in-party and out-party likes and dislikes, there remains a disproportionate 
amount of non-response. While Lavine and colleges were able to resolve this issue by 
having additional questions placed on the ANES survey, those questions only appeared for 
one year and are not available for the 2016 dataset. However, the non-response issue in this 
context would inhibit, rather than amplify, any relationships. Based on the extremity side 
of the ambivalence formula components with a value of zero cannot be ambivalent. 
Furthermore, leveraging this measure, which is one of the most commonly utilized 
ambivalence indices in the political science literature, strengthens the significance of any 
4 Short of reviewing thousands opened ended questions multiple times there is no way to 
validate the of this coding.  
- 40 - 
detected relationships between digital political information consumption and ambivalent 
political attitudes.
Group Ambivalence 
The next ambivalence index I constructed also came from Lavine (2005) and was 
designed to tap an unexplored aspect of ambivalent partisan identities. The group 
ambivalence measure uses the ANES feeling thermometers measuring respondents affect 
toward social groups commonly associated with the liberal and conservative dichotomy. 
While most of the ambivalence indices in the political science literature, and in this study, 
focus on cognitive ambivalence, the group ambivalence measure taps into the affective 
dimension of the tripartite theory of attitudes. In addition to tapping into a different aspect 
of attitude structure, the formula for constructing the index is slightly different from the 
others in this study. Unlike like the other indices, the group ambivalence index relies on 
variables for which both valances are present in the collection process. Both the ANES 
questions and the image in the response book5 indicate that the midpoint of 50 on the 
thermometer represents the neutral position. The formula for group ambivalence is: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑏 =  
(|𝐺𝐶 −50|+ |𝐺𝐿 − 50|)
2
− |𝐺𝐶 − 𝐺𝐿|. Where the GC and GL represent the average
score of the thermometers for the respective groups. The absolute values on the left-hand 
side of the equation coerce the scores into unipolar measures and maintain the functional 
integrity of the Griffin index. 
5 See Figure 3.2 in Appendix A 
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An unfortunate feature regarding this index is it treats indifference and ambivalence 
as mathematically identical. Both maximum evaluation pairs (GC=100, GL=100) and 
minimum evaluation pairs (GC=0, GL=0) produce maximum index scores of 50. 
There were eight liberal groups and eight conservative groups used in the 
construction of the ambivalence measure for this study6. I measure the average liberal 
affect using the ANES feeling thermometers for transgender people, unions, gays and 
lesbians, blacks, Muslims, liberals, feminists, and the activist group Black Lives Matter. 
For the conservative group measure, the thermometers measure the feelings towards big 
business, the rich, Chief Justice Roberts, Christians, the police, whites, conservatives, and 
fundamentalist Christians. 
In addition to indices registering an alpha score of 0.80, a correlation test revealed 
a small but statistically significant correlation of correlation coefficient of -0.2 at p <.0001. 
Prior to generating the group ambivalence index, I scaled both groups affect measures by 
a factor of 20 to make the analysis more consistent with the other measures. 
-Table 3.2- 
Like partisan ambivalence, the level of ambivalence about social groups is low. The 
population is not extremely ambivalence about group affect. After scaling the index ranges 
from -2.5 to 5 the middle of the index 1.5. the mean level of group ambivalence comes in 
well below this point atµ= 0.103 with a standard deviation of σ= 0.73.
6 There were originally ten liberal groups and eight conservative groups. I made an atheoretical 
decision to make the number of thermometers equivalent. The selection process was based on both 
an exploratory factor analysis and Cronbach alpha scores. The scores measured feelings about the 
Pope and feelings about scientists. 
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Candidate Ambivalence 
The third ambivalence measure for this study appears in the literature as candidate 
ambivalence (Rudolph and Popp 2007). Like the partisan ambivalence measure described 
earlier, this measure uses Lavine’s comparative ambivalence formula  𝐴𝑚𝑏 =  
(𝐷+𝑅)
2
 −
|D − 𝑅|. However in the context of candidate ambivalence the 𝐷 =
(𝑃𝐷+𝑁𝑅)
2
and 𝑅 =
(𝑃𝑅+𝑁𝐷)
2
components of the comparative ambivalence index use likes and dislikes for 
political candidates rather than political parties. Further, this measure also relies on the use 
of open-ended responses to measure the positive and negative evaluations separately. 
Again, while scholar’s in the past have been able to rely on the ANES’ coded counts 
for this measure, the coded data were not yet released at the time of this study. Resultantly, 
this measure faces the same threat to reliability in that there is no way to assess the accuracy 
of conclusions I reached while coding these data. Additionally, being that the questions are 
administered in the same format as the party likes and dislikes questions, there is a 
significant portion of respondents who did not respond, making non-response relatively 
high. 
-Figure 3.3- 
In addition to the problem of potential measurement error, reducing the measurable 
presence of ambivalent attitudes about candidates, the 2016 presidential election was one 
of the most emotionally charged elections in American history. Resultantly, expecting high 
degrees of ambivalence between candidates is unreasonable. However, while most of this 
study focuses on ambivalence, it is specifically focused on whether increased internet use, 
as a source of political information, is a factor in reducing ambivalence and aiding in the 
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polarization of the American electorate. Since partisan and candidate ambivalence have 
been found to inhibit vote choice, if there are significant results on this measure, it may 
provide insight into how President Trump was able to mobilize previously inactive portions 
of the American electorate. 
As expected, the ambivalence scores for the candidate ambivalence measure are 
low relative to the other measures. In addition to the low mean of µ= -0.26, 75% of the data 
fall under and ambivalence score of .25 indicating that most of the American electorate 
was polarized about their 2016 vote choice. If digital political information consumption 
does have a significant negative effect on ambivalent attitudes, perhaps the presidential 
Twitter feed is more effective than some would like to admit. 
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Value ambivalence 
The last ambivalence measure for this study comes in the form of value 
ambivalence. Dating back to Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (Tocqueville 1835), the 
seemingly contradictory nature of American political values has been a primary feature of 
political analysis. Several scholars view conflicting values as an antecedent to, rather than 
a type of, ambivalent attitudes (Craig et al. 2003). While strong arguments can be made on 
both sides of the debate as to whether value conflict and ambivalence can, at times, be the 
same thing, there is a precedent for treating them as such. At its least, value conflict is an 
antecedent of ambivalence and could potentially act as a proxy for otherwise unspecified 
types of ambivalence. It could be, however, that not only is value conflict an antecedent of 
ambivalent attitudes which can aid in predicting what type of people are predisposed to be 
ambivalent, but it is also a deeply ingrained form of ambivalence dictating a wide variety 
of attitudinal variability. In this study value conflict is treated as a type of ambivalence I 
have labeled value ambivalence. 
This measure uses the ANES batteries for traditionalism and egalitarianism to 
model conflicting value judgments as attitudinal ambivalence. The ANES has a long 
tradition of utilizing these value batteries. Both batteries measure their respective values 
using a set of four questions with two question loading positively and two loadings 
negatively for the 2016 survey. Respondents are instructed to indicate whether they agree 
strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree 
strongly to the with the following statements:
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• If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many
fewer problems.
• If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many
fewer problem.
• This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people
are.
• Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has
an equal opportunity to succeed.
• The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral
behavior to those changes.
• The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.
• We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their
own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.
• This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis
on traditional family ties.
After recoding all four questions in each battery to run in the same substantive 
direction, I performed a reliability analysis to assess the validity of the indices. 
-Table 3.3- 
Although the data for these indices were gathered using a technique which fails to 
separate the positive and negative reactions of the statement, it is not the specific attitudinal 
responses that are of interest for this index. Taken in summative from, the responses 
measures two univalent constructs in opposition to one another and the take the for the P 
and N in the Griffin ambivalence index. Following the index construction, I scaled the 
measures by a factor of 25 to resemble the range of the three other ambivalence indices. 
The resulting index has a mean score of µ=1.09 indicating that the public not experiencing 
a high degree of value ambivalence; however, the standard deviation of this index is higher 
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than the rest at σ = 1.2 placing one standard deviation within a moderate level of 
ambivalence7. 
7 When reading ambivalence scales the level of ambivalence for balanced ambivalent attitudes 
is always equal to the component pair. Thus a (3,3) will have an ambivalence score of three. See 
Table 2.1 in appendix.  
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Ambivalence in the Public 
-Figure 3.4-
While some scholars find ambivalence to be common in the population, these data 
show mixed findings. For both candidate ambivalence and partisan ambivalence, the data 
indicate that the public is generally not at all ambivalent8. For group ambivalence, the data 
show that 34% of respondents have moderately conflicting evaluations of ideologically 
sorted groups and for value ambivalence, the data show that 34% of respondents have 
valence pairs be between (5,3) and (5,4) indicating a moderate level of ambivalence around 
personal values. 
8 This is possibly a result of the nonresponse problem with these indices. 
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
For the analysis, I created three separate models for each ambivalence index that 
was discussed in the previous chapter to test the relationship between digital political 
information consumption and ambivalence. Each ambivalence index is modeled as a 
function of digital information consumption while controlling for age, education, political 
interest, political knowledge, traditional media consumption, the ANES Wordsum 
summative index for intelligence, need to evaluate score (NTE), dummy variables for 
gender (females and race (white), party identification, and a variable that was derived from 
a question asking respondents if they felt as though they understood politics. Two 
additional control variables for traditionalism and egalitarianism were included in nine of 
the twelve models but were excluded from the value ambivalence models9. 
One model for each ambivalence index was estimated using the full sample of 
respondents who completed both the pre-election survey and the post-election survey, and 
then again for a subset who had an associate’s degree or higher, and a subset of those whose 
educational attainment was lower than an associate’s degree. Prior to estimating the 
9 See Appendix B for original ANES variable labels and Question wording for the control 
variables used in the following analysis. 
- 49 - 
models, all variables with exception of the two dummy variables for gender and race were 
converted to z-scores. Additionally, I used the ANES weight10 for the full sample data to 
correct for differences in the online and face-to-face sampling designs . Table 5.1 shows 
the results of all four ambivalence models for the full sample of the ANES data.11  
-Table 4.1-
The digital political information (DPI) indicator was statistically significant in three 
out of the four models. For the nationally representative sample of voting-age adults in the 
United States, digital political information consumption reduces group ambivalence, 
candidate ambivalence, and value ambivalence. For a one standard deviation increase in 
the DPI index, the group ambivalence is decreased -0.08 standard deviation with a P<.01, 
candidate ambivalence is reduced -0.04 standard deviations with p<.1, and value 
ambivalence is reduced -0.09 standard deviations at p<.01. For the subset of individuals 
with at least an associate degree, digital political information consumption is statistically 
significant for the same three types of ambivalence. 
-Table 4.2-
Like the full sample, the effect of digital information consumption did not reach 
statistical significance for partisan ambivalence. For group ambivalence and value 
ambivalence a one standard deviation increase on the DPI index results in a -0.10 decrease 
the level of ambivalence at p<.01, while candidate ambivalence is reduced by -0.08 
standard deviation decrease at p<.05. The difference in magnitude of effects between the 
10 The variable for the 2016 time series full sample weight is V160102. 
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full sample and the degree-holding sample across group ambivalence, candidate 
ambivalence, and value ambivalence is 0.02, 0.04, and 0.01 respectively indicating that 
digital political information consumption affects those with a college education more 
strongly relative to cognitive and affective evaluations of social groups, political 
candidates, and within their value hierarchy. 
-Table 4.3-
The sample subset with less than an academic associate degree, digital political 
information consumption reached statistical significance in only two of the four 
ambivalence models. For this segment of the population, gathering political information 
online reduces ambivalence for affect for social groups and value ambivalence. For a one 
standard deviation increase in the DPI index group ambivalence is reduced -0.06 standard 
deviation at p< .1 and value ambivalence is reduced by -0.08 standard deviations at p< .01. 
In total, digital political information consumption produced statistically significant results 
in eight of the twelve ambivalence models. Indicating that individuals as able to effectively 
gather political information online and use that information to reduces conflicting 
evaluation about feelings towards social groups, political candidates, and their personal 
values. 
In addition to digital political information consumption, a variety of control 
variables registered statistically significant results across the twelve models. Party 
identification, ranging from strong republican to strong democrat, is statistically significant 
at p<.01 across all twelve models. Across all three samples, individuals who more strongly 
identify as democrats have lower levels of partisan ambivalence, candidate ambivalence, 
and value ambivalence, is reduced. Conversely, as an individual becomes intensely 
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associated with the democratic party, their feelings towards groups associated with liberal 
and conservative ideologies become more conflicted. In contrast to the DPI index, the 
control for traditional media consumption tends to increase ambivalence. For individuals 
with college degrees, traditional media increases partisan ambivalence, group ambivalence, 
and value ambivalence. In the general public, it increases partisan ambivalence, and for 
those, without a college degree, it reduces candidate ambivalence. These findings support 
the idea that the internet is creating one-sided information environments. 
IQ, as measured by the ANES Wordsum Index, is statistically significant for 7 of 
the 12 models. Levels of partisan ambivalence increase as IQ increases for both the full-
population sample and the degree-holding sample, while levels of value ambivalence 
decrease in the same two samples. For the general population only, group ambivalence 
decreases as IQ increases. While IQ is statistically significant for candidate ambivalence 
in the degree-holding sample and for those without degrees, the direction of the 
relationships is in disagreement such that IQ increases candidate ambivalence for those 
with college degrees and reduces candidate ambivalence for those without a college degree. 
For all three samples, having an interest in politics is negatively correlated with 
value ambivalence. For the full sample and those without a college degree, interest in 
politics reduces group ambivalence. Lastly, for those in the college degree-holding sample 
and the general population, interest in politics reduces candidate ambivalence. 
For all three samples, political knowledge significantly reduces group ambivalence. 
For degree holders and non-degree holders, political knowledge reduces candidate 
ambivalence, and in the general population and degree-holding population, it reduces value 
ambivalence. 
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For the subjective measure asking respondents whether they understand politics, 
the relationship is negative and significant for group ambivalence, candidate ambivalence, 
and value ambivalence in the degree-holding sample and the general population. For those 
without a degree, the relationships between the subjective measure of understanding 
politics and group ambivalence are positive and significant. 
The control variable for the need to evaluate cognitive style reduces value 
ambivalence and group ambivalence for all three samples while additionally reducing 
partisan ambivalence for the full sample. Egalitarian values increase group ambivalence 
and candidate ambivalence in the sample without college degrees and increase group 
ambivalence in the general population. For both the full sample and the degree-holding 
sample, traditional values increase candidate ambivalence and reduce group ambivalence 
for the full sample and those without a college education. In all three samples, age 
significantly reduces partisan ambivalence and candidate ambivalence while increasing 
value ambivalence in all three samples. 
The dummy variable for gender (female) indicates that women experience less 
partisan ambivalence and candidate ambivalence in the full sample and the degree-holding 
sample. Gender produces no significant effects for those without a college education.  
Lastly, the dummy variable for race (white) indicates that whites experience less groups 
ambivalence and value ambivalence for all three samples. 
Many of these findings are in line with the selective exposure and online 
information processing theories would predict. Across the board, individuals who are more 
likely to engage in deliberative evaluations and to use the internet for political information 
gathering see significant reductions in the ambivalence. many of the negative effects on 
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ambivalence are from indicators of various characteristics of cognition. Moreover, the fact 
that all of the statistically significant effects of digital political information consumption 
are negative as expected suggests that as a source of information the internet reduces 
internal cognitive and affective conflict.
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
Like most political attitudes and behaviors, and attitudes and behaviors more 
generally, party identification age education time in his capacity race and gender all affect 
the dependent variable. However, as expected, digital political information consumption 
consistently reduced various forms of political ambivalence. When comparing the total 
number of statistically significant results between traditional media consumption and 
digital political information consumption the results indicate a qualitative difference 
between the two sources of information. While general media consumption reduced 
candidate ambivalence for those without a college degree, information gathering using 
traditional media produced four statistically significant results increasing the level of 
ambivalence and respondents. 
This study is focused on the internet has a mediator of ambivalent attitudes. While 
the results indicate that information gathering on the internet reduces conflicting attitudinal 
states, the implications extend into state political discourse and political behavior. While 
these measures do not adequately capture indifference, the literature treats non-ambivalent 
attitudes as either polarized attitudes or indifferent attitudes. If Lavine et al. (2012)
concluded that ambivalen partisans are a key feature of healthy democracies, what will 
the future of American democracy look like ask the internet continues to invade every 
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of our private lives? Will election predictions become more accurate as voter’s make more 
conclusive evaluations earlier in the campaign process? Will ambivalence reduction 
increase political polarization in the general public and contribute to the increasing gridlock 
in the American legislature? 
While this study did not examine any of the effects of ambivalence, the literature 
suggests that there are many consequential results of political ambivalence. Identifying the 
internet as a moderator of ambivalent attitudes contributes to the existing body of literature 
by merging the study of ambivalence with modern information environments. These 
positive results lend support to the idea that the American electorate is becoming more 
attitudinally polarized and ideologically consistent (Pew Research Center) . 
Americans were most ambivalent when it came to attitudes reflecting their values 
regarding egalitarianism and traditionalism. Further, the strongest effect of the DPI index 
were for value ambivalence, suggesting that when provided the opportunity to seek out 
information in concordance with their value preferences individuals are more easily able 
to resolve internal value ambivalence. 
One of the more significant findings of this study is the difference between the 
degree-holding population and the rest of the population. This finding is in line with several 
studies that indicate on-line processing has a strong effect on the strength of judgments 
(Kim and Garrett 2012; Lodge et al. 1989; Lodge and Taber 2007; Rudolph and Popp 2007; 
Kim 2009). 
While digital political information consumption failed to reach significance in three 
out of the twelve total models, all three cases were for partisan ambivalence. Due to the 
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open-ended nature of the partisan ambivalence index and candidate ambivalence index, 
there was some expectation of null results. Although the models failed to find effects for 
the reduction partisan ambivalence, significant effects were found for candidate 
ambivalence. While the magnitude of the significant results is small to moderate, group 
ambivalence, candidate ambivalence, and value ambivalence are all reduced by digital 
political information. 
If the general population is becoming less ambivalent about politics, the implication 
is that their attitudes are becoming more univalent or polarized. This finding lends support 
to the findings of other scholars about the polarization of the American electorate. 
Additionally, as greater percentages of the population migrate towards the internet for their 
political information and become less ambivalent about their partisanship and their values, 
the need for the political elite to court the median voter may ultimately become irrelevant, 
thus entirely changing the foundations of electoral calculus and our understanding of 
American electoral politics. 
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Appendix A: Figures and Tables 
Table 2.1: Summary of Ambivalence Indices 
Kaplan: 𝐀𝐌𝐁 = 𝐓𝐀 − 𝐏𝐎𝐋 
Negative 
Component 
Positive Component 
Captures ambivalence 
when positive and 
negative component 
increase or decrease 
simultaneously. 
Fails to 
distinguish level 
of ambivalence 
when holding 
the weaker 
component 
constant. 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 2 2 2 
2 2 4 4 4 
3 2 4 6 6 
4 2 4 6 8 
Katz: |𝑨𝑴𝑩| = 𝑨𝝆 ∗ 𝑨𝑵
Negative 
Component 
Positive Component 
Corrects Kaplan’s 
problem of distinction 
for degrees of 
ambivalence. 
Scores fail to 
capture those 
similar in 
intensity but 
opposed in 
valence 
1 2 3 4 
1 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 
2 0.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 
3 0.00 1.50 3.00 2.50 
4 -0.50 1.00 2.50 4.00 
Griffin: 𝐀𝐌𝐁 =  (𝐀𝐏 + 𝐀𝐍)/𝟐 − |𝐀𝐏 − 𝐀𝐍|
Negative 
Component 
Positive Component 
Models ambivalence as 
a function of similarity 
and extremity. 
1 2 3 4 
1 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 
2 0.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 
3 0.00 1.50 3.00 2.50 
4 -0.50 1.00 2.50 4.00 
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Table 3.1: Digital Political Information Consumption Index 
Alpha Std.Alpha r 
Has Facebook 
Household internet Use 
Campaign internet Attention: Post 
Sent A Political Message: Post 
Campaign internet Attention: Pre 
Campaign Social Media Attention: Pre 
Owns a Smart Phone 
0.64 0.64 0.54 
0.71 0.71 0.24 
0.68 0.67 0.41 
0.67 0.67 0.44 
0.69 0.67 0.39 
0.64 0.64 0.57 
0.69 0.68 0.36 
Alpha reliability = 0.71 
Standardized alpha = 0.7 
Note: 
Table 3.2: Group Ambivalence Indices 
Conservatives Groups Feeling Thermometers 
Alpha Std.Alpha r 
Big Business 0.77 0.76 0.53 
Christians 0.76 0.75 0.60 
Conservatives 0.75 0.74 0.65 
Fundamentalist Christians 0.76 0.76 0.57 
Police 0.78 0.77 0.47 
Rich 0.77 0.77 0.50 
Roberts 0.79 0.79 0.39 
Whites 0.80 0.80 0.31 
Alpha reliability = 0.80 
Standardized alpha = 0.79 
Liberal Groups Feeling Thermometers 
Alpha Std.Alpha r 
Blacks 0.87 0.87 0.41 
Black Lives Matter 0.85 0.84 0.65 
Feminists 0.84 0.84 0.68 
Liberals 0.84 0.84 0.70 
Muslims 0.85 0.84 0.66 
Gay and Lesbian 0.84 0.84 0.67 
Transgender 0.84 0.84 0.71 
Unions 
0.87 0.87 0.46 
Alpha reliability = 0.87 
Standardized alpha = 0.86 
Note: 
- 7
0
- 
- 71 - 
Figure 3.2 
- 7
2
 - 
Figure 3.3 
- 7
3
 - 
Figure 3.4 
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Table 3.3: Values Indices 
Traditional Values 
TRAD1 0.69 0.69 0.39 
TRAD2 0.58 0.58 0.56 
TRAD3 0.64 0.66 0.46 
TRAD4 0.6 0.61 0.52 
Alpha = 0.69 
Standardized Alpha= 0.7 
Egalitarian Values 
EGAL1 0.61 0.61 0.38 
EGAL2 0.55 0.57 0.47 
EGAL3 0.57 0.60 0.44 
EGAL4 0.57 0.57 0.45 
Alpha= 0.65 
Standardized Alpha= 0.65 
Table 3.4: Ambivalence Scores Central Tendency 
µ σ Index Max Index Min 
Partisan Ambivalence 0.04 0.65 5 -2.5 
Group Ambivalence 1.25 0.82 4 -2 
Candidate Ambivalence -0.26 0.8 5 -2.5 
Value ambivalence 2.09 1.2 5 -2.5 
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Table 4.1 
Digital Political Information Consumption and Ambivalence 
Full Sample: OLS 
Partisan 
 Amb. 
Group 
 Amb. 
Candidate 
Amb. 
Value 
Ambivalence 
PID -0.12*** 0.11*** -0.14*** -0.22*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Digital Political Information 
Consumption 
-0.02 -0.08*** -0.04* -0.09*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Traditional Media Consumption 0.04* 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.03 -0.06*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
IQ 0.06** -0.07*** 0.02 -0.17*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Interest in Politics 0.03 -0.04* -0.09*** -0.04** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Political Knowledge 0.04 -0.16*** -0.01 -0.10*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Understands Politics -0.01 -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.05*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gender (Female) -0.13*** 0.05 -0.07** -0.01 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Need to Evaluate Score -0.04* -0.14*** -0.02 -0.10*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Egalitarianism 0.01 0.04* 0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Traditionalism 0.003 -0.05** 0.04** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race (White) -0.03 -0.20*** -0.01 -0.19*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age -0.08*** 0.03 -0.14*** 0.20*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.08* 0.13*** 0.05 0.14*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
N 2,891 2,430 2,891 2,891 
R2 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.20 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.19 
Residual Std. Error 
df = 
0.99 
(2876) 
0.92 
(2415) 
0.96 
(2876) 
0.91 
(2878) 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
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Table 4.2 
Digital Political Information Consumption and Ambivalence 
Degree Holders: OLS  
Partisan 
Amb. 
Group 
Amb. 
Candidate 
Amb. 
Value 
Ambivalence 
PID -0.13*** 0.06* -0.17*** -0.34*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Digital Political Information 
Consumption 
0.01 -0.10*** -0.08** -0.10*** 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Traditional Media Consumption 0.07** 0.07** 0.03 0.05* 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Education -0.13* 0.08 0.04 -0.14**  
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
IQ 0.11** 0.02 0.07* -0.17***  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Interest in Politics 0.06 -0.05 -0.11*** -0.14***  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Political Knowledge 0.03 -0.15*** -0.08** -0.08**  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Understands Politics -0.05 -0.06* -0.10** -0.07**  
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Gender (Female) -0.24*** 0.01 -0.19*** 0.002  
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Need to Evaluate Score -0.03 -0.15*** 0.02 -0.09***  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Egalitarianism -0.0004 0.003 -0.04 
 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Traditionalism 0.01 -0.01 0.09** 
 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Race (White) -0.01 -0.21*** -0.09 -0.30***  
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Age -0.10** 0.005 -0.20*** 0.25*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Constant 0.31*** 0.10 0.20** 0.30***  
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
N 1,442 1,265 1,442 1,442 
R2 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.26 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.25 
Residual Std. Error 
df = 
1.02  
(1427) 
0.83 
 (1250) 
0.99  
(1427) 
0.87  
(1429) 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
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Table 4.3 
Digital Political Information Consumption and Ambivalence 
No Degree: OLS 
 
Partisan 
Amb. 
Group  
Amb. 
Candidate 
Amb. 
Value 
ambivalenc
e 
PID -0.11*** 0.15*** -0.09*** -0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Digital Political Information 
Consumption 
-0.04 -0.06* -0.02 -0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Traditional Media Consumption 0.08 0.05 -0.13** -0.01 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Education 
 
0.03 -0.11*** -0.004 -0.16*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
IQ 0.01 -0.04 -0.09*** 0.004 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Interest in Politics 0.05 -0.17*** 0.03 -0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Political Knowledge 0.01 -0.08** -0.07*** -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Understands Politics -0.06 0.09* 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Gender (Female) 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Need to Evaluate Score -0.04 -0.12*** -0.03 -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Egalitarianism 0.02 0.08** 0.07***  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
Traditionalism 0.001 -0.10*** -0.01  
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  
Race (White) -0.04 -0.17*** 0.07 -0.09* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age -0.06** 0.05 -0.11*** 0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.03 0.08 -0.19** 0.12 
PID (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
N 1,449 1,165 1,449 1,449 
R2 0.02 0.19 0.06 0.13 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.18 0.06 0.12 
Residual Std. Error 
df = 
0.96 
(1434) 
1.00 
(1150) 
0.91 
(1434) 
0.94 
(1436) 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
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Appendix B: Question Wording for Control Variables 
Traditional media 
V162002: How many programs about the campaign for President did you watch on 
television? None, just one or two, several, or a good many / A good many, several, just one 
or two, or none? 
V162003: How many speeches or discussions about the campaign for President did 
you listen to on the radio? None, just one or two, several, or a good many / A good many, 
several, just one or two, or none? 
V162005: How many stories about the campaign for President did you read about 
in any newspaper? None, just one or two, several, or a good many / A good many, several, 
just one or two, or none? 
From which of the following sources have you heard anything about the 
presidential campaign? 
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V161363a, V161363b, V161363c, and V161363e: From which of the following 
sources have you heard anything about the presidential campaign? (Mark all that apply) 
1.Television news programs (morning or evening) 
2.Newspapers 
3.Television talk shows, public affairs, or news analysis programs 
4.Internet sites, chat rooms, or blogs 
5.Radio news or talk shows 
6.Have not heard anything about the presidential campaign from any of 
these sources 
Education 
V161270: What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest 
degree you have received? 
1.Less than 1st grade 
2.1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th grade 
3.5th or 6th grade 
4.7th or 8th grade 
5.9th grade 
6.10th grade 
7.11th grade 
8.12th grade no diploma 
9.High school graduate - high school diploma or equivalent (for example: 
GED) 
10. Some college but no degree 
11. Associate degree in college - Occupational/vocational program 
12. Associate degree in college -- Academic program  
13. Bachelor's degree (For example: BA, AB, BS) 
14. Master's degree (For example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA) 
15. Professional School Degree (For example: 
MD,DDS,DVM,LLB,JD) 
16. Doctorate degree (For example: PhD, EdD) 
95.  Other (SPECIFY)
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IQ 
WORDSUM question wording unavailable 
Interest in Politics 
V162256: How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you very 
interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, or not at all interested? 
Political Knowledge 
V162072: Joe Biden. What job or political office does he hold now? 
V162073b: Paul Ryan.  What job or political office does he now hold? 
V162074b: Angela Merkel What job or political office does she now hold? 
V162075b: Vladimir Putin What job or political office does he now hold? 
V162076a: John Roberts What job or political office does he now hold? 
V161513: For how many years is a United States Senator elected – that is, how 
many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator? 
V161514: On which of the following does the U.S. federal government currently 
spend the least? 
1.Foreign aid
2.Medicare
3.National defense
4.Social Security
V161515: Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in 
the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington? 
1.Democrats
2.Republicans
V161516: Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in 
the U.S. Senate? 
1.Democrats
2.Republicans
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V162137: What was the current unemployment rate in the United States as of 
November 4, 2017? 
1.Rate 2.9 percent
2.Rate 4.9 percent
3.Rate 6.9 percent
4.Rate 8.9 percent
Understands Politics 
V162258: You feel you understand the most important political issues of this 
country. 
1.Agree strongly
2.Agree somewhat
3.Neither agree nor disagree
4.Disagree somewhat
5.Disagree strongly
Gender 
V161342: What is your gender? 
1.Male
2.Female
3.Other
NTE Score 
V162253x: Not applicable; administrative or derived variable 
Egalitarianism 
V162243: Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone 
has an equal opportunity to succeed.’ Looking at page [PRELOAD: page] in the booklet. 
Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or 
disagree strongly / disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree 
somewhat, or agree strongly with this statement?
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V162244: Still looking at page [PRELOAD:page] in the booklet. This country 
would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.’ Do you agree strongly, 
agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly / 
disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree somewhat, or agree 
strongly with this statement? 
V162245: Still looking at page [PRELOAD: page] in the booklet. ‘It is not really 
that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.’ Do you agree 
strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree 
strongly / disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree 
somewhat, or agree strongly with this statement? 
V162246: Still looking at page PRELOAD: page in the booklet. ‘If people were 
treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.’ Do you agree 
strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree 
strongly / disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree 
somewhat, or agree strongly with this statement? 
Traditionalism 
V162207: Still looking at page [PRELOAD: page] in the booklet. The world is 
always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.’ Do 
you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or 
disagree strongly / disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree 
somewhat, or agree strongly with this statement?
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V162208: Still looking at page [PRELOAD: page] in the booklet. The newer 
lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.  Do you agree strongly, agree 
somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly / disagree 
strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree somewhat, or agree strongly 
with this statement? 
V162209: Still looking at page [PRELOAD: page] in the booklet. We should be 
more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if 
they are very different from our own. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree 
nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly / disagree strongly, disagree 
somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree somewhat, or agree strongly with this 
statement? 
V162210: Still looking at page [PRELOAD: page] in the booklet. This country 
would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. 
Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or 
disagree strongly / disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, agree 
somewhat, or agree strongly with this statement? 
Race 
V161310x: I am going to read you a list of five race categories. Please choose one 
or more races that you consider yourself to be: 
- white; 
- black or African-American; 
- American Indian or Alaska Native; 
- Asian; or  
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander? 
(PROBE FOR RACE IF R SAYS HISPANIC OR A HISPANIC ORIGIN) 
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Age 
V161267: Not applicable; administrative or derived variable.
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